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American War and Iraqi People

28 October, 2010

 

The Iraq War in Context

Paul Rogers, October 2010

http://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/publications/monthly_briefings/iraq_war_context

 

Internal US military logs on the Iraq War released by Wikileaks on 22 October have raised numerous issues about coalition behaviour, including attacks on civilians, as well as collusion in covering up the abuse and killing of prisoners. The document releases also show that coalition forces kept numerous records of civilian casualties while claiming that “We do not do body counts”. On this issue, a full analysis of the vast number of records will take many months, but extensive work already undertaken by Iraq Body Count – a partner organisation of ORG – shows that the logs contain details of at least 15,000 civilian deaths not previously recorded. Adding the new information to the careful monitoring carried out by IBC since the war started, indicates that around 150,000 violent deaths related to the conflict have been recorded since the war began, with 122,000 of them being civilian.

While the majority of all the civilian deaths resulted from insurgent action or because of the extensive inter-communal conflict that developed after the initial occupation, some tens of thousands stemmed from coalition military action. Furthermore, once Iraq had been occupied by US and other coalition forces, those forces were legally responsible for maintaining order in what was now an occupied territory. This they failed to do.

If lessons are to be learnt from the Iraq War, among the key questions are, why were so many civilians killed by coalition forces, and why were the coalition forces unable to contain the rapidly developing insurgency? There is enough information available to provide answers to these questions, but much of the analysis has to relate to events unfolding right at the start of the war.

Expectations

Although it is commonly believed that the cause of the problems faced by the Coalition forces in Iraq was a lack of post-war planning, in reality there was a very clear vision of what would happen once the Saddam Hussein regime had been terminated. The occupation was to be run from the Pentagon, rather than the State Department, a Coalition Provisional Authority would be established that was directly responsible to the Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, and all the old Iraqi government ministries would initially be headed by coalition personnel. By June 2003, three months after the invasion, Paul Bremmer had been appointed Head of the CPA and there was then a clear expectation of how Iraq would develop. This would be on full free market lines, the aim being to have a pro-western administration established in Baghdad that would oversee the privatisation of nationalised industries and the opening up of Iraq to foreign investment with a flat-rate tax system and a minimum of financial regulation.

Iraq would thus develop into a model free market economy that might be followed, in due course, across the region. The Department of Defense also looked to establish four large permanent military bases, ensuring long-term Iraqi security while constraining any of Iran’s regional ambitions. Given the extent of the Persian Gulf oil reserves – over 60% of world totals – this would be particularly valuable in relation to long-term US security interests. All of these ambitions were predicated on an easy overthrow of the Saddam Hussein regime and on the presumption that such radical change would be widely welcomed by the Iraqis.

It is also essential to remember that regime termination in Iraq was seen within the US military as a direct response to 9/11 . In his January 2002 State of the Union address President George W Bush had extended the concept of the war on terror against al-Qaida to encompass an “axis of evil” of states supporting terrorism and developing weapons of mass destruction, with Iraq the most immediate threat. The war started within 18 months of 9/11, and the US Army and Marines entering Iraq saw it entirely in this context. To them, any opposition to what they saw as the fully justified response to the attacks on the twin towers and the Pentagon was not viewed as resistance to occupation but as terrorism.

Outcomes

Right from the start of the war on 20 March 2003, these presumptions were turned on their head. By the time the US forces had occupied Baghdad, just three weeks later, military units right across southern Iraq were facing serious opposition from large numbers of irregular Iraqi forces. The first suicide bomb attack on a US unit happened in the second week of the war, and so great was the threat to the crucial supply lines through from Kuwait to Baghdad that the equivalent of three Army brigades were diverted to protect the supply lines. This was approximately 30% of all the available combat troops and represented a completely different dynamic to that anticipated by the planners.

Almost from the start, there were incidents of US forces facing paramilitary attacks and responding with heavy use of firepower, resulting in civilian deaths and injuries. This was little reported at the time, in the near-euphoria of an apparently easy dismantling of the regime. However, the practice of embedding journalists with military units did mean that some accounts surfaced at a very early stage, even if largely ignored by analysts at the time. In one incident, within a few hours of a Marines advance into Baghdad, the International Herald Tribune published one example:

Caught in the crossfire, according to a chilling account by an Associated Press reporter, were a number of pedestrians, including an old man with a cane, looking confused. When he failed to heed three warning shots by the Marines, they killed him. A red van and an orange-and-white taxi were also riddled with bullets after they failed to heed warning shots.

As the war progressed over the next year, the US Army and Marines Corps found themselves facing a very heavily embedded insurgency fighting in a largely urban environment. This was almost entirely unexpected and was being faced by forces primarily trained for conventional combat rather than urban counter-insurgency.

Moreover, the attitude of the US forces was affected by the nature of the casualties. In conventional warfare during the Vietnam era, a very large proportion of seriously injured troops died on the battlefield. For every soldier killed, three might survive with serious injuries. By the time of the Iraq War, huge improvements in battlefield medicine, rapid casualty evacuation and body armour meant that far more seriously injured troops survived. They often did so, though, with appalling injuries, especially to the face, throat and groin, and with the loss of limbs. Young soldiers and Marines therefore saw many of their comrades affected in this way, and the psychological impact was great.

Moreover, they saw the people inflicting these deaths and terrible injuries as terrorists opposing an entirely justified operation by a country that had suffered a massive attack on its own civilians. As a consequence, and as the war developed during 2003 and 2004, it became more and more common for US forces to rely heavily on one of their few military advantages over the insurgents – their overwhelming firepower whether delivered by artillery, multiple rocket launchers, helicopter gun-ships or strike aircraft.

Some scattered evidence of this trend emerged slowly, usually through reports from embedded journalists, but the full impact was scarcely recognised in the United States or Western Europe. One incident which illustrates the nature of the conflict was reported on 15 April 2004 by a foreign correspondent with the Washington Post, Pamela Constable. She was attached to a Marines unit operating in the city of Fallujah, west of Baghdad. The city was becoming a centre of the insurgency and on one occasion a supply convoy was edging towards a Marines post on the edge of the US-controlled area of the city when it was attacked, some of the vehicles becoming isolated within a built-up area. A large rescue column was organised, with tanks and strike aircraft in support, and this fought a three-hour battle with insurgents before the Marines in the original convoy could withdraw safely, albeit with some injuries.

At least 20 insurgents were reported killed when the conflict finally ended at dusk but the rescue operation was seen as a success. A local US commander was quoted in the Washington Post article:

“This is a story about heroes. It shows the tenacity of the Marines and their fierce loyalty to each other. They were absolutely unwilling to leave their brother Marines behind.”

The level of resistance experienced by the Marine supply convoy was far greater than expected and what then happened is highly significant. To quote the Washington Post again:

“Just before dawn, Wednesday… AC-130 Spectre gun-ships launched a devastating punitive raid over a six-block area around where the convoy was attacked, firing dozens of artillery shells that shook the city and lit up the sky. Marine officials said the area was virtually destroyed and that no further insurgent activity has been seen there.”

The AC-130 is a development of the Lockheed C-130 Hercules which has side-mounted machine guns and a powerful 105mm howitzer. The plane circles a target area firing the weapons with considerable accuracy at a designated target area. The howitzer, in particular, has a devastating effect, capable of firing 200 high explosive shells in a matter of minutes. The attack on the Fallujah neighbourhood, several hours after the ambush, was the equivalent of destroying a small town and was, as the Post reported, a punitive raid. The human impact on that part of the city, especially on the families living there, was not reported.

This incident in Fallujah was one of the few that came to light at the time, another being an incident near the city of Baquba later in 2004. There, a US Army unit was engaged in a bitter fire-fight with insurgents, eventually overcoming opposition but only with great difficulty. The angered soldiers killed some insurgents and then strapped their bodies to the bonnets of the jeeps, like hunting trophies, and paraded them through the city, an embedded journalist reporting on the sullen crowd that witnessed this. To the soldiers this was an action that spoke of their deep frustration at this protracted opposition from men regarded as terrorists. For the local people it added further to their opposition to occupation.

The Fallujah and Baquba incidents are two of the few examples reported at the time but many more have since been identified, some of them in the documents just released. They confirm an overall picture of the sheer anger and bitterness experienced by so many American military units, faced with an insurgency that was entirely unexpected and for which they were largely untrained.

Responsibilities

Seeking to understand the behaviour of the coalition forces – especially the troops on the ground – is in no way an attempt to justify it. Indeed many of the actions may well amount to war crimes. What it does try to do, though, is to put it in context. What happened in Fallujah and Baquba, and what was repeated many times across Iraq, was a consequence of the original decision to go to war. This, in turn, was a core part of the Bush administration’s determination to extend the conflict against al-Qaida to a much wider conflict against an axis of evil.

This was a political decision taken by those at the core of the Bush administration and it is there that responsibility finally lies. The recent revelations confirm in some detail what was already widely suspected and lend further support to the case for a fundamental reappraisal of the entire war. More generally, and in relation to civilian casualties, they offer support for a movement within significant elements of international civil society that is beginning to attract attention. This is based on the argument that any party that embarks on a war should report in detail on the people it kills and injuries and on the circumstances of those actions. It may take years for such an apparently straightforward task to be widely accepted but, if it eventually is, then a much more accurate understanding of the true costs of war might become possible.

 

Paul Rogers is Professor of Peace Studies at the University of Bradford and Global Security Consultant to Oxford Research Group (ORG). His international security monthly briefings are available from the ORG website at www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk, where visitors can sign-up to receive them via email each month.

 

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The Commonwealth Games and the Indian Reality

27 September, 2010

“The Commonwealth Games and the Indian Reality”

David Robinson

http://www.onlineopinion.com.au/view.asp?article=11044

International sport is often said to be about far more than the competition, promoting intercultural understanding, friendship and respect. In the case of the unfolding Commonwealth Games in New Delhi, disorganisation and athlete’s living conditions have put a strain on the latter two values, but hopefully this occasion will at least stimulate greater understanding in the minds of the worldwide audience.

A number of stand-out quotations running through the Australian media point to the heart of the issues in New Delhi. The head of the English Commonwealth Games team, Craig Hunter, described the conditions of the athlete’s village as ‘uninhabitable’. “It’s just not satisfactory… the toilets … are clearly a mess …The air conditioning isn’t working, there’s flooding, doors have been hung in an incorrect manner … The hot and cold water feeds are reversed”. Commonwealth Games Federation chief executive Mike Hooper concurs that the Games Village is, “filthy and certainly uninhabitable”.

In contrast, the leading Indian sports official Lalit Bhanot has pleaded to Indian reporters, “Please try to understand, according to me and you the room is clean, fine. They want a certain standard of hygiene”. And here we have the nub of the matter: the conditions that are found ‘uninhabitable’ by visiting Westerners are of a level that the  middle classes of Indian society experience in their every-day lives as the norm, and poor Indians can only imagine as an unattainable luxury. Toilets? Hot and cold running water? Air conditioning! Let these Western representatives step onto the street on any Indian town or village and explain their woes to the passers-by.

India has a rose-tinted place in the imaginations of many Westerners, its people romanticised and orientalised, its landscape and history embedded within a British Raj narrative. Meanwhile, India is rightfully viewed internationally as an ascending political and economic force. India has experienced amazing economic expansion, with its average GDP growth rate hovering at around 7 percent a year. It is also envisaged that in the next two decades India’s population will surpass China’s, and that its rapidly expanding middle class may come to out-populate Europe. India has also been reaching out overseas, seeking oil and gas from the major Gulf countries and Central Asian states, and increasing their investments throughout Africa. So India’s rising global economic importance is no fallacy.

Meanwhile, the United States has courted burgeoning India as an economic and military ally. The US has supported the Indian nuclear energy programme to help power the growing Indian economy, with the unspoken secondary motive of aiding India’s nuclear weapons capacity. India has embraced these growing military responsibilities by spending tens of billions of dollars on creating what is commonly regarded as the world’s fourth most powerful military. Increasingly this force will include long-range aircraft, aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines intended to exert India’s power throughout the Indian Ocean region, and medium and long-range ballistic missiles with a global reach. The world is aware that India is becoming a ‘Great Power’.

But despite its meteoric economic development, India contains both the best of the First World and the worst of the Third World within its borders, and faces unprecedented human security challenges. India now has 410 million people living below the U.N. poverty line – 37.2 percent of its population and actually 100 million more people than in 2004 – and millions of India’s rural poor are faced with food price inflation of up to 17 percent. Nearly half of South Asia’s children suffer malnourishment, and women remain vastly over-represented among the ranks of the poor.

60 percent of Indian labour is still agricultural, and the integration of hundreds of millions of peasants into a modern economy will be an extremely painful process. While Indian infrastructure such as roads, civil aviation, ports, and telecommunications have experienced noticeable improvements in recent years, electricity, railways, and irrigation all still need significant investment; and India continues to lag in social infrastructure, such as education and healthcare. Meanwhile, these social inequalities have fuelled the widespread ‘Naxalite’ Maoist insurgency affecting vast areas throughout eastern and central India, which Prime Minister Manmohan Singh identified as the “greatest internal security threat” facing the nation.

In response to this the international community consistently fails to live up to the goals for development aid which they have promised, perpetuating a situation in which millions of people in India and around the world die every year from poverty-related starvation and disease, and those who subsist live qualities of life far-below their physical and mental potentials. Overseas aid certainly did not rate a mention in our own recent elections, and seemingly the only concerns Australians now have about overseas development and conflict regard how many refugees Australia will be forced to incarcerate as a result.

This is the real context of ‘Commonwealth Crisis’ in Delhi. Within the narrow confines of the debate about whether facilities are acceptable, it is the Indian organisers who are the villains. But take a few steps back and examine Indian society, its place in the world, and the expectations that Westerners have come to regard as normal, and surely those decrying their accommodation must feel shame at the lifestyles that we have come to live, while many around the world scrape out a meagre existence.

In the News: America’s Secret War in Pakistan

23 September, 2010

In historical parallel to US operations in Cambodia and Laos during the Vietnam War, America is now engaged in a secret war in Afghanistan.

“Counterterrorist Pursuit Team: 3,000 Man CIA Paramilitary Force Hunts Militants In Afghanistan, Pakistan”.

KIMBERLY DOZIER and ADAM GOLDMAN

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/09/22/counterterrorist-pursuit-_n_734961.html

WASHINGTON — The CIA has trained and bankrolled a well-paid force of elite Afghan paramilitaries for nearly eight years to hunt al-Qaida and the Taliban for the CIA, according to current and former U.S. officials.

Modeled after U.S. special forces, the Counterterrorist Pursuit Team was set up in the months following the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2002 to penetrate territory controlled by the Taliban and al-Qaida and target militants for interrogations by CIA officials.

The 3,000-strong Afghan teams are used for surveillance and long-range reconnaissance missions and some have trained at CIA facilities in the United States. The force has operated in Kabul and some of Afghanistan’s most violence-wracked provinces including Kandahar, Khost, Paktia and Paktika, according to a security professional familiar with the program.

The security official and former intelligence officials spoke about the Afghan force on the condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to discuss the sensitive information.

The secret Afghan force has emerged as a new component of ramped-up American counter-terror operations against the Taliban in Afghanistan and against al-Qaida and allies over the mountainous border in Pakistan. The U.S. military, including special operations forces, has been working with the CIA in an intensified crackdown against militants on both sides of the border.

Drone strikes run by the CIA are at their highest level yet against Afghan Taliban, Haqqani and al-Qaida leaders in Pakistan, while U.S. special operations forces have been staging combined raids with Afghan army special forces against the midlevel leadership that operates on the Afghan side.

The Afghan pursuit teams were described in detail in Bob Woodward’s new book, “Obama’s Wars,” due out Monday. Woodward reported that the units conducted covert operations inside neighboring Pakistan’s lawless border areas as part of a campaign against al-Qaida and Taliban havens.

Pakistan allows U.S. special operations forces to enter the border region only for limited training missions. The use of Afghan paramilitaries to carry out spying activities will likely inflame already frayed political relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

“We do not allow any foreign troops or militia to operate on our side of the border,” Pakistani army spokesman Maj. Gen. Athar Abbas said. “There are no reports of any such incident, and, should it happen in future, they will be fired upon by our troops.”

Unlike regular Afghan army commandos, the CIA-run Afghan paramilitary units mostly work independently from CIA paramilitary or special operations forces but will occasionally combine forces for an operation. Despite operating independently, the units coordinate their operations with NATO, the security professional said.

The Afghan force became the focus of a debate last year between CIA and military officials over who would control its operations. The CIA remained the lead agency, the former official said. The paramilitaries earn generous salaries compared to Afghans employed by the army or police.

The CIA-run Afghan paramilitary in Kandahar were compensated on an elite pay scale, according to human rights investigators. The average paramilitary in the force could earn $340 a month while a regiment head could take home as much as $1,000.

In Uruzgan, the U.S. pays members $300 to $320 per month. In comparison, a freshly recruited Afghan solider in troubled Helmand province earns about $240 a month. And Afghan policemen make an average starting salary of only about $140 per month. Even the Taliban reportedly pays its footsoldiers about $250 to $300 a month.

While U.S. officials insist the paramilitary forces have an excellent record, at least one unit stumbled badly in the past. The Kandahar branch paramilitaries shot and killed Kandahar’s police chief and nine other Afghan police officials in 2009 over a dispute after one of its own members was arrested. During their face-off with the police chief, the paramilitaries were wearing uniforms and guns bought by the CIA.

Current and former U.S. officials said the incident had been reviewed fully and that the review found that CIA officers had no prior knowledge that the Afghans had intended to go on a killing spree. One U.S. official said the review showed that the incident was not typical of the force and that the paramilitaries were reacting to what they viewed as the unfair arrest of one their people by one of their rivals.

Jonathan Horowitz, a human rights expert working with the Open Society Institute, said: “These paramilitary groups operate in such a cloak of secrecy that accountability for their abuses is nearly impossible for most Afghans. These forces don’t fall under an Afghan military chain of command, and if a civilian is killed or maimed, the U.S. can say it wasn’t the fault of the U.S.

Horowitz added that Afghan civilians have regularly accused these paramilitary groups of physical abuse and theft of property during night raids, conduct that he said taints Afghan views of the U.S. forces who arm, train and pay them.

___

Dozier reported from Kabul. Associated Press writer Chris Brummitt in Islamabad contributed to this report.

Critical Security Studies

16 September, 2010

My posts haven’t been very prolific lately, but I decided I would wait until I had written something new and original before I posted again. This is an essay on Critical Security Studies, written as part of the Master of International Relations course I am currently undertaking. It is a lot more theoretical than my usual posts.

Critical Security Studies and the Deconstruction of Realist Hegemony.

David Alexander Robinson

Though still marginal within the field of International Relations, over the last two decades a paradigm of Critical Security Studies has developed that challenges traditional definitions of ‘security’ and emphasises the socially-constructed nature of state identities and international systems. This essay will examine the key elements of the critical security approach with particular focus on the ‘Copenhagen School’ – which calls for a broadening of the concept of ‘security’ and highlights the process of ‘securitization’ of political issues – and the ‘Welsh School’, which draws on Marxism and Critical Theory to create a self-consciously activist approach that emphasises ‘emancipation’. These will be set in contrast to the hegemonic discourse of Neorealism, and it will be noted that these critical theories are gradually beginning to be used in analysis of real relations and events.

Since the mid-Twentieth Century ‘security studies’ has been largely synonymous with the theoretical paradigm of Realism (Classical/Neorealism). Ken Booth writes,

“Traditional security thinking, which has dominated the subject for half a century, has been associated with the intellectual hegemony of realism … empha[sizing] military threats and the need for strong counters; it has been status quo orientated; and it has centered on states”. [1]

Realists see states as preoccupied with their own physical safety and autonomy, in an international system defined by its anarchy. “The nature of the system, and its pressures and constraints, are the major factors determining the security goals and relations of national governments”.[2] States are in constant competition to increase their power relative to other states (often in a military form), and these international interactions are more important than states’ domestic cultures, leaders or political systems in determining behaviour.[3] Realist scholar Kenneth Waltz’s Theory of International Politics, which combined an individualist ‘micro-economic’ approach to the international system with a Classical Realist emphasis on power and material interests, is an important example of Neorealist thinking.[4] For Waltz, the international system requires states to operate competitively or be eliminated, like corporations within a free market.[5] Waltz observes that, “In anarchy, security is the highest end. Only if survival is assured can states seek such other goals as tranquility, profit, and power”.[6]

No IR theory emphasises security more than Neorealism, yet David Baldwin observes that Neorealist analysts have rarely critically-analysed what security means.[7] During the Cold War security studies was dominated by interest in military statecraft, and security was uncritically tethered to strategic issues. Thus military force, not security itself, was the focus of security studies and the Realist school.[8] Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams argue that Neorealism achieved hegemony in the field by defining security studies as a cumulative collection of objective knowledge, of which Neorealist theory is the legitimate expression.

“Supported by this metahistorical and epistemological foundation is a series of foundational claims that are now presented as unproblematic facts. The most important of these concerns the centrality of the state as the subject of security and provides the basis for the exclusion of issues other than those of traditional military diplomacy from the field”.[9]

Advocates of the paradigm(s) of Critical Security Studies (CSS) have used historical watersheds such as the end of the Cold War and the 9/11 terrorist attacks to call for reassessment within security studies. They have emphasised growing international interdependence, the danger of arms races, the heavy burden of defence spending, and the changing nature of threats to people’s daily lives, as reasons to formulate a definition of security less focused on military power and more inclusive of economic, social, political and environmental issues.[10] However, while real world events provided social and political space for these theoretical dissidents, their critiques of Realism are based in far deeper epistemological disagreement. Fundamentally, constructivist IR theoreticians criticise Neorealism’s failure to recognise how international systems are socially-constructed.

“As Richard Ashley has noted, [the Neorealist] account rests on ‘an understanding of international society … in which … there exists no form of sociality, no intersubjective consensual basis, prior to or constitutive of individual actors or their private ends’”.[11]

Increasingly theorists are accepting that, in contradistinction to the Neorealist position, the structures and dynamics of international relations, “are determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces, and … that the identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed by these shared ideas rather than given in nature”.[12] This shift from Realist ‘rational choice theory’ “to a focus on historically and reflexively constituted practices” provides a more interrogative and insightful paradigm for understanding international relations.[13]

Barry Buzan’s book, People, States, and Fear (1983), was a seminal text in the development of CSS, broadening the concept of security to include political, economic, societal, and ecological elements, and discussing the idea that individual humans were the ‘irreducible base units’ for security.[14] However, for Bill McSweeney, Buzan’s insistence that states remain the referent object in his analysis meant that he did not break radically with the Neorealist explanatory model.[15] By the beginning of the 1990s growing numbers of theorists began embracing more critical analyses of security, in the context of the transformation of the bipolar international system. The critical approach increasingly introduced an ‘instability-of-the-object’ into the understanding of international affairs, and began to posit security as a relational rather than absolute quality.[16] The name ‘Critical Security Studies’ was then adopted for the field by the participants at a small conference: ‘Strategies in Conflict: Critical Approaches to Security Studies’ – at York University, Toronto, in May 1994.[17]

At the core of the constructivist theories is the understanding that actors/objects relate to each other within a landscape of collectively-constructed social configurations. States classify each other as friends and enemies on the basis of their identities and intentions, rather than purely on the objective distribution of power: “U.S. military power has a different significance for Canada than for Cuba, despite their similar ‘structural’ positions”.[18] Actors in the system acquire relatively stable identities through their relations with other states and institutions, but these identities are inherently social in nature and set in the context of understandings that actors collectively hold about themselves and one another. Institutions that emerge from this collective cognition are then often experienced by individual actors as coercive social facts.[19] So, as Jeff Coulter notes, “social configurations are not ‘objective’ like mountains or forests, but neither are they ‘subjective’ like dreams or flights of speculative fancy. They are … intersubjective constructions”.[20]

Even as Critical Security Studies began emerging as a self-conscious field in the early 1990s, it was already experiencing theoretical diversification – Krause and Williams lamenting in 1997 that, “reconceptualizing security has often come to resemble a grab bag of different issue areas, lacking a cohesive framework for analysing the complementary and contradictory themes at work”.[21] Then in 1998 Buzan released the book, Security: A New Framework for Analysis, with Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde, restating the need for security studies to diversify its foci (to the political/economic/societal/ecological), and to concretely distinguish a new ‘Copenhagen School’ from other Critical Security Studies. A core component of the Copenhagen analysis was that, “the social production of security is sufficiently stable to be treated objectively”.[22] Buzan et al made clear their variance with much of the field, stating that:

“An emerging school of ‘critical security studies’ (CSS) wants to challenge conventional security studies by applying postpositivist perspectives, such as critical theory and poststructuralism. Much of its work … deals with the social construction of security, but CSS mostly has the intent … of showing that change is possible because things are socially constituted. …  [But the Copenhagen School maintain that] even the socially constituted is often sedimented as structure and becomes so relatively stable as practice that one must do analysis also on the basis that it continues … in our purposes we are closer to traditional security studies, which at its best attempted to grasp security constellations and thereby steer them into benign interactions. This stands in contrast to the ‘critical’ purposes of CSS, which point toward a more wholesale refutation of current power wielders”.[23]

Another defining element of the Copenhagen School, particularly established by Ole Waever, was the idea of ‘securitization’ of political issues.

The Copenhagen School’s ‘securitization’ analysis emphasises that ‘national security’ is often invoked by states to legitimise the use of force or other extraordinary actions, and then to mobilise resources and exercise special powers that would otherwise be unacceptable for domestic and international audiences. An issue is securitized when it is,

“presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure. … the actor [claims] a right to handle the issue through extraordinary means, to break the normal political rules of the game (e.g., in the form of secrecy, levying taxes or conscription, placing limitations on otherwise inviolable rights, or focusing society’s energy and resources on a specific task). … it is in this practice that the issue becomes a security issue – not necessarily because a real existential threat exists but because the issue is presented as such a threat”.[24]

A successful securitization process thus first posits an existential threat, then demands an emergency response, and finally undertakes actions that break free of normal social and political rules. Usually the process of securitization conforms to the particular rhetorical structure in which the problem/challenge is equated with state survival, and then given priority of action, “because if the problem is not handled now it will be too late, and we will not exist to remedy our failure”.[25] Securitization is thus a ‘speech-act’, in which a performance of the securitization’s rhetorical process creates rights, commitments or obligations; and the process is also intersubjective in that the audience must accept or tolerate the securitization for the act to be successful.[26] Buzan et al also note that,

“in some cases securitization has become institutionalized. Constant drama does not have to be present, because it is implicitly assumed that when we talk of this (typically, but not necessarily, defense issues), we are by definition in the area of urgency…”[27]

– obvious examples being the threat of Communism during the Cold War, and Islamic fundamentalism today. Buzan et al thus conclude that ‘national security’ is a concept that has been used to silence opposition and allow power-holders to circumvent democracy. They therefore argue that ‘security’ should actually be seen as negative: “as a failure to deal with issues as normal politics”.[28] Waever continues that ideally issues should be ‘desecuritized’ and removed from the security agenda.[29]

The Copenhagen School attracts various criticism from within CSS, commonly focused on the assumptions the School shares with the Realist tradition.[30] Wendt points out that the Copenhagen School follows Neorealists in accepting that anarchies have a particular ‘logic’ and fails to deconstruct interactions within those systems.[31] McSweeney criticises them for portraying identity as an objective social reality to be discovered, rather than a negotiated process continually shaped by social forces.[32] While Johan Eriksson argues that security itself is a social construct, and points out that by calling for a broadening of areas to be considered as elements of security the Copenhagen School may be actually increasing the scope of issues that can be securitized.[33]

Another attempt to produce a coherent CSS approach has been recognised in what is now called the ‘Welsh School’. Ken Booth and colleagues have built their School’s approach around elements of Marxism, Gramscianism, and post-Marxist Critical Theory, with a particular penchant for the Frankfurt School of Marxist thought and the theorist Jurgen Habermas.[34] Some key elements of Welsh School thinking are that ‘emancipation’ should be the primary purpose of CSS, and that research is a form of political practice with normative elements. Thus their research aims to denaturalise the dominant security discourse and investigate opportunities for social transformation.[35] In this context ‘emancipation’ is defined as freeing individuals from, “War and the threat of war … poverty, poor education, political oppression and so on”.[36] They assert that researchers should be, “self-reflexive with regard to the normative implications of their work … [and make] a concern for human emancipation endogenous to their work”.[37] Steve Smith notes that the normative element of the Welsh School attracts criticism from those advocating ‘objectivity’, but argues that in reality there is, “no neutral place to stand to pronounce on the meaning of the concept of security, all definitions are theory-dependent, and all definitions reflect normative commitments”.[38] For Booth and the Welsh School the concept of ‘emancipation’ should be privileged over power and order, which are at other people’s expense, and “true (stable) security can only be achieved by people and groups if they do not deprive others of it”.[39]

Finally, it may be asked whether the CSS framework can actually be applied to real-world events. While this field is still embryonic, analyses are starting to be produced on the basis of these ideas. Examples include Ralf Emmers, who draws on the Copenhagen School to argue that ASEAN securitized the illicit drug trade in Asia, and notes the “securitization rather than the criminalization of terrorism … [and] the so-called war on drugs”;[40] Eli Stamnes from the Welsh School who demonstrates how CSS can shed light on UN operations in Macedonia[41]; and Paul Williams who argues that CSS helps reveal the true beneficiaries of South African economic policies, and emphasises the need for constructive transformation in South African society.[42]

Thus, from Buzan’s call for a broadening of security’s definition in the 1980s, Critical Security Studies has grown into a diverse field that challenges all aspects of thinking surrounding security and the functioning of the international system. Within CSS the Copenhagen and Welsh Schools have so far managed to construct the most coherent and influential approaches, though the diversity and self-critical nature of the field as a whole is its strength. The idea of broadening ‘security’ seems to be increasingly accepted in mainstream IR, and the concepts of ‘securitization’ and ‘emancipation’ are starting to be deployed in real-world analyses. Though connected to CSS, the emerging field of Human Security is seen by some to be superfluous, as CSS may already articulate its ideas and some scholars remain, “suspicious of human security as a hegemonic discourse co-opted by the state”.[43] This has led to the characterisation of Human Security as ‘Critical Security Studies-lite’. Generally the influence of CSS within IR today remains limited, but the growing awareness and popularity of the paradigm bodes well for the future of critical thought and hopefully humanity.

Bibliography

Baldwin, David A. “The Concept of Security”, Review of International Studies, No 23, 1997, pp5-26.

Booth, Ken. “Security and Emancipation”, Review of International Studies, No 17, 1991, pp313-326.

Buzon, Barry, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde, “Security Analysis”, in Security: A New Framework for Analysis, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, 1998, pp21-47.

Emmers, Ralf. “ASEAN and the Securitization of Transnational Crime in Southeast Asia”, The Pacific Review, Vol 16, No 3, 2003, pp419-438.

Krause, Keith and Michael C. Williams, “From Strategy to Security: Foundations of Critical Security Studies”, in Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams (eds), Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases, UCL Press, London, 1997, pp33-59.

McSweeney, Bill. Security, Identity and Interests: A Sociology of International Relations, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004.

Morgan, Patrick. “Security in International Politics: Traditional Approaches”, in Alan Collins (ed), Contemporary Security Studies, Oxford Uni Press, Oxford, 2007, pp13-33.

Mutimer, David. “Critical Security Studies: A Schismatic History”, in Alan Collins (ed), Contemporary Security Studies, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007, pp53-74.

Newman, Edward. “Critical Human Security Studies”, Review of International Studies, No 36, 2010, pp77-94.

Smith, Steve. “The Contested Concept of Security”, in Ken Booth (ed), Critical Security Studies and World Politics, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, 2005, pp27-62.

Stamnes, Eli. “Critical Security Studies and the United Nations Preventive Deployment in Macedonia”, International Peacekeeping, Vol 11, No 1, Spring 2004, pp161-181.

Wendt, Alexander. “Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics”, International Organization, Vol 46, No 2, Spring 1992, pp391-425.

Wendt, Alexander. Social Theory of International Politics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999.

Williams, Michael C. “Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics”, International Studies Quarterly, No 47, 2003, pp511-531.

Williams, Paul. “South African Foreign Policy: Getting Critical?”, Politikon, Vol 27, No 1, 2000, pp73-91.


[1] Ken Booth, “Security and Emancipation”, Review of International Studies, No 17, 1991, p318.

[2] Patrick Morgan, “Security in International Politics: Traditional Approaches”, in Alan Collins (ed), Contemporary Security Studies, Oxford Uni Press, Oxford, 2007, pp16-17.

[3] Morgan, “Security in International Politics”, pp16-17.

[4] Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999, p2.

[5] Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, p16.

[6] Kenneth Waltz quote in David A. Baldwin, “The Concept of Security”, Review of International Studies, No 23, 1997, p21.

[7] Baldwin, “The Concept of Security”, p21.

[8] Baldwin, “The Concept of Security”, p9.

[9] Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams, “From Strategy to Security: Foundations of Critical Security Studies”, in Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams (eds), Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases, UCL Press, London, 1997, p38.

[10] Booth, “Security and Emancipation”, p318.

[11] Richard Ashley quoted in Krause and Williams, “From Strategy to Security”, p41.

[12] Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, p1.

[13] Krause and Williams, “From Strategy to Security”, p52.

[14] Steve Smith, “The Contested Concept of Security”, in Ken Booth (ed), Critical Security Studies and World Politics, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, 2005, p32.

[15] Bill McSweeney, Security, Identity and Interests: A Sociology of International Relations, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004, p123.

[16] McSweeney, Security, Identity and Interests, p3.

[17] David Mutimer, “Critical Security Studies: A Schismatic History”, in Alan Collins (ed), Contemporary Security Studies, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007, p56.

[18] Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics”, International Organization, Vol 46, No 2, Spring 1992, p397.

[19] Wendt, “Anarchy is what States Make of it”, pp396-399.

[20] Jeff Coulter quoted in Wendt, “Anarchy is what States Make of it”, p406.

[21] Krause and Williams, “From Strategy to Security”, p35.

[22] Mutimer, “Critical Security Studies”, p62.

[23] Barry Buzon, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde, “Security Analysis”, in Security: A new Framework for Analysis, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, 1998, pp34-35.

[24] Buzon et al, “Security Analysis”, p24.

[25] Buzon et al, “Security Analysis”, p26.

[26] Ralf Emmers, “ASEAN and the Securitization of Transnational Crime in Southeast Asia”, The Pacific Review, Vol 16, No 3, 2003, p422.

[27] Buzon et al, “Security Analysis”, p27.

[28] Buzon et al, “Security Analysis”, p29.

[29] Smith, “The Contested Concept of Security”, p34.

[30] Michael C. Williams, “Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics”, International Studies Quarterly, No 47, 2003, p512.

[31] Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, p21.

[32] Smith, “The Contested Concept of Security”, p35.

[33] Smith, “The Contested Concept of Security”, p36.

[34] Mutimer, “Critical Security Studies”, p62.

[35] Eli Stamnes, “Critical Security Studies and the United Nations Preventive Deployment in Macedonia”, International Peacekeeping, Vol 11, No 1, Spring 2004, p162.

[36] Booth, “Security and Emancipation”, p319.

[37] Stamnes, “Critical Security Studies”, p163.

[38] Smith, “The Contested Concept of Security”, p28.

[39] Booth, “Security and Emancipation”, p319.

[40] Emmers, “ASEAN”, p421.

[41] Stamnes, “Critical Security Studies”, p177.

[42] Paul Williams, “South African Foreign Policy: Getting Critical?”, Politikon, Vol 27, No 1, 2000, p82.

[43] Edward Newman, “Critical Human Security Studies”, Review of International Studies, No 36, 2010, p77.

The New Great Game in the Caucasus

15 August, 2010

“The Caucasus Cauldron”

7 July 2010

By George Friedman

http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20100706_caucasus_cauldron?utm_source=GWeekly&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=100707&utm_content=readmore&elq=e547a8616b0640f28fa24c6ee8b11e9e

“This report is republished with permission of STRATFOR

U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visited some interesting spots over the July 4 weekend. Her itinerary included Poland and Ukraine, both intriguing choices in light of the recent Obama-Medvedev talks in Washington. But she also traveled to a region that has not been on the American radar screen much in the last two years — namely, the Caucasus — visiting Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia.

The stop in Poland coincided with the signing of a new agreement on ballistic missile defense and was designed to sustain U.S.-Polish relations in the face of the German-Russian discussions we have discussed. The stop in Ukraine was meant simply to show the flag in a country rapidly moving into the Russian orbit. In both cases, the trip was about the Russians. Regardless of how warm the atmospherics are between the United States and Russia, the fact is that the Russians are continuing to rebuild their regional influence and are taking advantage of European disequilibrium to build new relationships there, too. The United States, still focused on Iraq and Afghanistan, has limited surplus capacity to apply to resisting the Russians. No amount of atmospherics can hide that fact, certainly not from the Poles or the Ukrainians. Therefore, if not a substantial contribution, the secretary of state’s visit was a symbolic one. But when there is little of substance, symbols matter.

That the Poland and Ukraine stops so obviously were about the Russians makes the stops in Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia all the more interesting. Clinton’s statements during the Caucasian leg of her visit were positive, as one would expect. She expressed her support for Georgia without committing the United States to any arms shipments for Georgia to resist the Russians, who currently are stationed inside Georgia’s northern secessionist regions. In Azerbaijan and Armenia, she called on both countries to settle the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh, a disputed region within western Azerbaijan proper. Armenia took control of the region by force following the Soviet collapse. For Azerbaijan, the return of Nagorno-Karabakh under a U.N. resolution is fundamental to its national security and political strategy. For Armenia, retreat is not politically possible.

This means Clinton’s call for negotiations and her offer of U.S. help are not particularly significant, especially since the call was for Washington to help under the guise of international, not bilateral, negotiations. This is particularly true after Clinton seemed to indicate that the collapse in Turkish-Armenian talks was Turkey’s responsibility and that it was up to Turkey to make the next move. Given that her visit to the region seems on the surface to have achieved little — and indeed, little seems to have been intended — it is worth taking time to understand why she went there in the first place, and the region’s strategic significance.

The Strategic Significance of the Caucasus

The Caucasus is the point where Russia, Iran and Turkey meet. For most of the 19th century, the three powers dueled for dominance of the region. This dispute froze during the Soviet period but is certainly in motion again. With none of these primary powers directly controlling the region, there are secondary competitions involving Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, both among these secondary powers and between the secondary powers and the major powers. And given that the region involves the Russians, Iranians and Turks, it is inevitable that the global power would have an interest as well — hence, Hillary Clinton’s visit.

Of all the regions of the world, this one is among the most potentially explosive. It is the most likely to draw in major powers and the most likely to involve the United States. It is quiet now — but like the Balkans in 1990, quiet does not necessarily reassure any of the players. Therefore, seven players are involved in a very small space. Think of it as a cauldron framed by Russia, Iran and Turkey, occasionally stirred by Washington, for whom each of the other three major powers poses special challenges of varying degrees.

The Caucasus region dominates a land bridge between the Black and Caspian seas. The bridge connects Turkey and Iran to the south with Russia in the north. The region is divided between two mountain ranges, the Greater Caucasus to the north and the Lesser Caucasus in the south; and two plains divided from one another, one in Western Georgia on the Black Sea and another, larger plain in the east in Azerbaijan along the Kura River. A narrow river valley cuts through Georgia, connecting the two plains.

The Greater Caucasus Mountains serve as the southern frontier of Russia. To the north of these mountains, running east to west, lies the Russian agricultural heartland, flat and without any natural barriers. Thus, ever since the beginning of the 19th century, Russia has fought for a significant portion of the Caucasus to block any ambitions by the Turkish or Persian empires. The Caucasus mountains are so difficult to traverse by major military forces that as long as Russia maintains a hold somewhere in the Caucasus, its southern frontier is secure. During the latter part of the 19th century and for most of the Soviet period (except a brief time at the beginning of the era), the Soviet position in the Caucasus ran along the frontier with Turkey and Persia (later Iran). Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia were incorporated into the Soviet Union, giving the Soviets a deep penetration of the Caucasus and, along with this, security.

After the fall of the Soviet Union, the three Caucasian republics broke free of Moscow, pushing Russia’s frontier north by between about 160 to 320 kilometers (100-200 miles). The Russians still maintained a position in the Caucasus, but their position was not secure. The northern portion of the Caucasus consisted of Chechnya, Ingushetia, Dagestan and others, all of which had significant Islamist insurgencies under way. If the Russians abandoned the northeastern Caucasus, their position was breached. But if they stood, they faced an interminable fight.

Georgia borders most of the Russian frontier. In the chaos of the fall of the Soviet Union, various Georgian regions attempted to secede from Georgia with Russian encouragement. From the Georgian point of view, Russia represented a threat. But from the Russian point of view, Georgia represented a double threat. First, the Russians suspected the Georgians of supporting Chechen rebels in the 1990s — a charge the Georgians deny. The more important threat was that the United States selected Georgia as its main ally in the region. The choice made sense if the United States was conducting an encirclement strategy of Russia, which Washington was doing in the 1990s (though it became somewhat distracted from this strategy after 2001). In response to what it saw as U.S. pressure around its periphery, the Russians countered in Georgia in 2008 to demonstrate U.S. impotence in the region.

The Russians also maintained a close relationship with Armenia, where they continue to station more than 3,000 troops. The Armenians are deeply hostile to the Turks over demands that Turkey admit to massacres of large number of Armenians in 1915-16. The Armenians and Turks were recently involved in negotiations over the normalization of relations, but these talks collapsed — in our view, because of Russian interference. The issue was further complicated when a U.S. congressional committee passed a resolution in March condemning Turkey for committing genocide, infuriating the Turks.

One of the countercharges against Armenia is that it has conducted its own massacres of Azerbaijanis. Around the time of the Soviet breakup, it conducted a war against Azerbaijan, replete with the ethnic cleansing of hundreds of thousands of Azerbaijanis in a region known as Nagorno-Karabakh in western Azerbaijan, leaving Azerbaijan with a massive refugee problem. While the U.N. Security Council condemned the invasion, the conflict has been frozen, to use the jargon of diplomats.

The Importance of Azerbaijan

For its part, Azerbaijan cannot afford to fight a war against Russian troops in Armenia while it also shares a northern border with Russia. Azerbaijan also faces a significant Iranian problem. There are more Azerbaijanis living in Iran than in Azerbaijan; Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, is a prominent Azerbaijani-Iranian. The Soviets occupied all of Azerbaijan during World War II but were forced to retreat under British and American pressure after the war, leaving most of Azerbaijan inside Iran. The remainder became a Soviet republic and then an independent state.

The Azerbaijanis are deeply concerned about the Iranians. Azerbaijan is profoundly different from Iran. It is Muslim but heavily secular. It maintains close and formal relations with Israel. It has supported the war in Afghanistan and made logistical facilities available to the United States. The Azerbaijanis claim that Iran is sending clerics north to build Shiite schools that threaten the regime. Obviously, Iran also operates an intelligence network there.

Adding to the complexity, Azerbaijan has long been a major producer of oil and has recently become an exporter of natural gas near the capital of Baku, exporting it to Turkey via a pipeline passing through Georgia. From the Turkish point of view, this provides alternative sources of energy to Russia and Iran, something that obviously pleases the United States. It is also an obvious reason why Russia sees Azerbaijan as undermining its position as the region’s dominant energy exporter.

The Russians have an interest, demonstrated in 2008, to move southward into Georgia. Obviously, if they were able to do this — preferably by a change in government and policy in Tbilisi — they would link up with their position in Armenia, becoming a force both on the Turkish border and facing Azerbaijan. The Russians would like to be able to integrate Azerbaijan’s exports into its broader energy policy, which would concentrate power in Russian hands and increase Russian influence on Russia’s periphery. This was made clear by Russia’s recent offer to buy all of Azerbaijan’s natural gas at European-level prices. The Turks would obviously oppose this for the same reason the Russians would want it. Hence, the Turks must support Georgia.

Iran, which should be viewed as an Azerbaijani country as well as a Persian one, has two reasons to want to dominate Azerbaijan. First, it would give Tehran access to Baku oil, and second, it would give Tehran strategic bargaining power with the Russians, something it does not currently have. In addition, talk of present unrest in Iran notwithstanding, Iran’s single most vulnerable point in the long term is the potential for Azerbaijanis living in Iran to want to unite with an independent Azerbaijani state. This is not in the offing, but if any critical vulnerability exists in the Iranian polity, this is it.

Consider this from the American side. When we look at the map, we notice that Azerbaijan borders both Russia and Iran. That strategic position alone makes it a major asset to the United States. Add to it oil in Baku and investment by U.S. companies, and Azerbaijan becomes even more attractive. Add to this that its oil exports support Turkey and weaken Russian influence, and its value goes up again. Finally, add to it that Turkey infuriated Azerbaijan by negotiating with Armenia without tying the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh to any Turkish-Armenian settlement. Altogether, the United States has the opportunity to forge a beneficial relationship with Azerbaijan that would put U.S. hands on one of Turkey’s sources of oil. At a time when the Turks recognize a declining dependence on the United States, anything that could increase that dependence helps Washington. Moreover, Azerbaijan is a platform from which Washington could make the Iranians uncomfortable, or from which to conduct negotiations with Iran.

An American strategy should include Georgia, but Georgia is always going to be weaker than Russia, and unless the United States is prepared to commit major forces there, the Russians can act, overtly and covertly, at their discretion. A Georgian strategy requires a strong rear base, which Azerbaijan provides, not only strategically but also as a source of capital for Georgia. Georgian-Azerbaijani relations are good, and in the long run so is Turkey’s relation with these two countries.

For Azerbaijan, the burning issue is Nagorno-Karabakh. This is not a burning issue for the United States, but the creation of a stable platform in the region is. Armenia, by far the weakest country economically, is allied with the Russians, and it has Russian troops on its territory. Given that the United States has no interest in who governs Nagorno-Karabakh and there is a U.N. resolution on the table favoring Azerbaijan that serves as cover, it is difficult to understand why the United States is effectively neutral. If the United States is committed to Georgia, which is official policy, then it follows that satisfying Azerbaijan and bringing it into a close relationship to the United States would be beneficial to Washington’s ability to manage relations with Russia, Iran and Turkey.

U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates visited Azerbaijan a month ago and Clinton visited this weekend. As complex as the politics of this region are to outsiders, they are clearly increasing in importance to the United States. We could put it this way: Bosnia and Kosovo were obscure concepts to the world until they blew up. Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia and Abkhazia are equally obscure now. They will not remain obscure unless strategic measures are taken. It is not clear to us that Clinton was simply making a courtesy call or had strategy on her mind. But the logic of the American position is that it should think strategically about the Caucasus, and in doing so, logic and regional dynamics point to a strong relationship with Azerbaijan.

CIA and Google Invest in Predicting the Future

30 July, 2010

“Google, CIA Invest in ‘Future’ of Web Monitoring”

By Noah Shachtman

28 July 2010

http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2010/07/exclusive-google-cia/

The investment arms of the CIA and Google are both backing a company that monitors the web in real time — and says it uses that information to predict the future.

The company is called Recorded Future, and it scours tens of thousands of websites, blogs and Twitter accounts to find the relationships between people, organizations, actions and incidents — both present and still-to-come. In a white paper, the company says its temporal analytics engine “goes beyond search” by “looking at the ‘invisible links’ between documents that talk about the same, or related, entities and events.”

The idea is to figure out for each incident who was involved, where it happened and when it might go down. Recorded Future then plots that chatter, showing online “momentum” for any given event.

“The cool thing is, you can actually predict the curve, in many cases,” says company CEO Christopher Ahlberg, a former Swedish Army Ranger with a PhD in computer science.

Which naturally makes the 16-person Cambridge, Massachusetts, firm attractive to Google Ventures, the search giant’s investment division, and to In-Q-Tel, which handles similar duties for the CIA and the wider intelligence community. It’s not the very first time Google has done business with America’s spy agencies. Long before it reportedly enlisted the help of the National Security Agency to secure its networks, Google sold equipment to the secret signals-intelligence group. In-Q-Tel backed the mapping firm Keyhole, which was bought by Google in 2004 — and then became the backbone for Google Earth.

This appears to be the first time, however, that the intelligence community and Google have funded the same startup, at the same time. No one is accusing Google of directly collaborating with the CIA. But the investments are bound to be fodder for critics of Google, who already see the search giant as overly cozy with the U.S. government, and worry that the company is starting to forget its “don’t be evil” mantra.
America’s spy services have become increasingly interested in mining “open source intelligence” — information that’s publicly available, but often hidden in the daily avalanche of TV shows, newspaper articles, blog posts, online videos and radio reports.

“Secret information isn’t always the brass ring in our profession,” then CIA-director General Michael Hayden told a conference in 2008. “In fact, there’s a real satisfaction in solving a problem or answering a tough question with information that someone was dumb enough to leave out in the open.”

U.S. spy agencies, through In-Q-Tel, have invested in a number of firms to help them better find that information. Visible Technologies crawls over half a million web 2.0 sites a day, scraping more than a million posts and conversations taking place on blogs, YouTube, Twitter and Amazon. Attensity applies the rules of grammar to the so-called “unstructured text” of the web to make it more easily digestible by government databases. Keyhole (now Google Earth) is a staple of the targeting cells in military-intelligence units.

Recorded Future strips from web pages the people, places and activities they mention. The company examines when and where these events happened (“spatial and temporal analysis”) and the tone of the document (“sentiment analysis”). Then it applies some artificial-intelligence algorithms to tease out connections between the players. Recorded Future maintains an index with more than 100 million events, hosted on Amazon.com servers. The analysis, however, is on the living web. “We’re right there as it happens,” Ahlberg told Danger Room as he clicked through a demonstration. “We can assemble actual real-time dossiers on people.”

Recorded Future certainly has the potential to spot events and trends early. Take the case of Hezbollah’s long-range missiles. On March 21, Israeli President Shimon Peres leveled the allegation that the terror group had Scud-like weapons. Scouring Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah’s past statements, Recorded Future found corroborating evidence from a month prior that appeared to back up Peres’ accusations.

That’s one of several hypothetical cases Recorded Future runs in its blog devoted to intelligence analysis. But it’s safe to assume that the company already has at least one spy agency’s attention. In-Q-Tel doesn’t make investments in firms without an “end customer” ready to test out that company’s products.

Both Google Ventures and In-Q-Tel made their investments in 2009, shortly after the company was founded. The exact amounts weren’t disclosed, but were under $10 million each. Google’s investment came to light earlier this year online. In-Q-Tel, which often announces its new holdings in press releases, quietly uploaded a brief mention of its investment a few weeks ago.

Both In-Q-Tel and Google Ventures have seats on Recorded Future’s board. Ahlberg says those board members have been “very helpful,” providing business and technology advice, as well as introducing him to potential customers. Both organizations, it’s safe to say, will profit handsomely if Recorded Future is ever sold or taken public. Ahlberg’s last company, the corporate intelligence firm Spotfire, was acquired in 2007 for $195 million in cash.

Google Ventures did not return requests to comment for this article. In-Q-Tel Chief of Staff Lisbeth Poulos e-mailed a one-line statement: “We are pleased that Recorded Future is now part of IQT’s portfolio of innovative startup companies who support the mission of the U.S. Intelligence Community.”

Just because Google and In-Q-Tel have both invested in Recorded Future doesn’t mean Google is suddenly in bed with the government. Of course, to Google’s critics — including conservative legal groups, and Republican congressmen — the Obama Administration and the Mountain View, California, company slipped between the sheets a long time ago.


Google CEO Eric Schmidt hosted a town hall at company headquarters in the early days of Obama’s presidential campaign. Senior White House officials like economic chief Larry Summers give speeches at the New America Foundation, the left-of-center think tank chaired by Schmidt. Former Google public policy chief Andrew McLaughlin is now the White House’s deputy CTO, and was publicly (if mildly) reprimanded by the administration for continuing to hash out issues with his former colleagues.

In some corners, the scrutiny of the company’s political ties have dovetailed with concerns about how Google collects and uses its enormous storehouse of search data, e-mail, maps and online documents. Google, as we all know, keeps a titanic amount of information about every aspect of our online lives. Customers largely have trusted the company so far, because of the quality of their products, and because of Google’s pledges not to misuse the information still ring true to many.

But unease has been growing. Thirty seven state Attorneys General are demanding answers from the company after Google hoovered up 600 gigabytes of data from open Wi-Fi networks as it snapped pictures for its Street View project. (The company swears the incident was an accident.)

“Assurances from the likes of Google that the company can be trusted to respect consumers’ privacy because its corporate motto is ‘don’t be evil’ have been shown by recent events such as the ‘Wi-Spy’ debacle to be unwarranted,” long-time corporate gadfly John M. Simpson told a Congressional hearing in a prepared statement. Any business dealings with the CIA’s investment arm are unlikely to make critics like him more comfortable. But Steven Aftergood, a critical observer of the intelligence community from his perch at the Federation of American Scientists, isn’t worried about the Recorded Future deal. Yet.

“To me, whether this is troublesome or not depends on the degree of transparency involved. If everything is aboveboard — from contracts to deliverables — I don’t see a problem with it,” he told Danger Room by e-mail. “But if there are blank spots in the record, then they will be filled with public skepticism or worse, both here and abroad, and not without reason.”

John Pilger on Wars and ‘Wars of Perception’

12 July, 2010

“The Charge of the Media Brigade”

By John Pilger

ON LINE Opinion: Australia’s e-journal of social and political debate

http://www.onlineopinion.com.au/view.asp?article=10668

First published in New Statesman on 8 July 2010.

The TV anchorwoman was conducting a split screen interview with a journalist who had volunteered to be a witness at the first execution of a man on death row in Utah for 25 years. “He had a choice,” said the journalist, “lethal injection or firing squad”. “Wow!” said the anchorwoman. Cue a blizzard of commercials for fast food, teeth whitener, stomach stapling, the new Cadillac. This was followed by the war in Afghanistan presented by a correspondent sweating in a flak jacket. “Hey, it’s hot,” he said on the split screen. “Take care,” said the anchorwoman. “Coming up” was a reality show in which the camera watched a man serving solitary confinement in a prison’s “hell hole”.

The next morning I arrived at the Pentagon for an interview with one of President Obama’s senior war-making officials. There was a long walk along shiny corridors hung with pictures of generals and admirals festooned in ribbons. The interview room was purpose-built. It was blue and arctic cold, and windowless and featureless except for a flag and two chairs: props to create the illusion of a place of authority. The last time I was in a room like this in the Pentagon a colonel called Hum stopped my interview with another war-making official when I asked why so many innocent civilians were being killed in Iraq and Afghanistan. Then it was in the thousands; now it is more than a million. “Stop tape!” he ordered.

This time there was no Colonel Hum, merely a polite dismissal of soldiers’ testimony that it was a “common occurrence” that troops were ordered to “kill every mother fucker”. The Pentagon, says the Associated Press, spends $4.7 billion on public relations: that is, winning the hearts and minds not of recalcitrant Afghan tribesmen but of Americans. This is known as “information dominance” and PR people are “information warriors”.

American imperial power flows through a media culture to which the word imperial is anathema. To broach it is heresy. Colonial campaigns are really “wars of perception”, wrote the present commander, General David Petraeus, in which the media popularises the terms and conditions. “Narrative” is the accredited word because it is post-modern and bereft of context and truth. The narrative of Iraq is that the war is won, and the narrative of Afghanistan is that it is a “good war”. That neither is true is beside the point. They promote a “grand narrative” of a constant threat and the need for permanent war. “We are living in a world of cascading and intertwined threats,” wrote the celebrated New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman, “that have the potential to turn our country upside down at any moment”.

Friedman supports an attack on Iran, whose independence is intolerable. This is the psychopathic vanity of great power which Martin Luther King described as “the greatest purveyor of violence in the world”. He was then shot dead.

The psychopathic is applauded across popular, corporate culture, from the TV death watch of a man choosing a firing squad over lethal injection to the Oscar winning Hurt Locker and a new acclaimed war documentary Restrepo. Directors of both films deny and dignify the violence of invasion as “apolitical”. And yet behind the cartoon façade is serious purpose. The US is engaged militarily in 75 countries. There are some 900 US military bases across the world, many at the gateways to the sources of fossil fuels.

But there is a problem. Most Americans are opposed to these wars and to the billions of dollars spent on them. That their brainwashing so often fails is America’s greatest virtue. This is frequently due to courageous mavericks, especially those who emerge from the centrifuge of power. In 1971, military analyst Daniel Ellsberg leaked documents known as the Pentagon Papers which put the lie to almost everything two presidents had claimed about Vietnam. Many of these insiders are not even renegades. I have a section in my address book filled with the names of former officers of the CIA, who have spoken out. They have no equivalent in Britain.

In 1993, C. Philip Liechty, the CIA operations officer in Jakarta at the time of Indonesia’s murderous invasion of East Timor, described to me how President Gerald Ford and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger had given the dictator Suharto “a green light” and secretly supplied the arms and logistics he needed. As the first reports of massacres arrived at his desk, he began to turn. “It was wrong,” he said. “I felt badly.”

Melvin Goodman is now a scholar at Johns Hopkins University in Washington. He was in the CIA more than 40 years and rose to be a senior Soviet analyst. When we met the other day, he described the conduct of the cold war as a series of gross exaggerations of Soviet “aggressiveness” that wilfully ignored the intelligence that the Soviets were committed to avoid nuclear war at all costs. Declassified official files on both sides of the Atlantic support this view. “What mattered to the hardliners in Washington,” he said, “was how a perceived threat could be exploited”. The present secretary of defence, Robert Gates, as deputy director of the CIA in the 1980s, had constantly hyped the “Soviet menace” and is, says Goodman, doing the same today “on Afghanistan, North Korea and Iran”.

Little has changed. In America, in 1939, W.H. Auden wrote:

As the clever hopes expire
Of a low dishonest decade:
Waves of anger and fear
Circulate over the bright
And darkened lands of the earth,
Obsessing our private lives […]
Out of the mirror they stare,
Imperialism’s face
And the international wrong